The latest Moscow Format on Afghanistan failed to deliver a joint statement, but the deeper problem is the widening perception gap between Moscow and Islamabad<\/p>\n
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at the Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security last week, called the Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan \u201cthe most representative platform for developing a region-wide consensus.\u201d
\nIt is hard to argue with the central point of the foreign minister\u2019s remark. The Moscow Format really is broad-based, bringing together not only Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, but also India, Iran, China, and Pakistan, as well as guest delegations such as Belarus and Egypt.
\nYet while few doubt the forum\u2019s representative character, the question of whether it can actually produce a region-wide consensus is much more complicated. At its anniversary meeting last month (the format has been in place since 2016) the participants could not even agree on a joint final statement.
\nMoscow still appears to believe that the platform remains effective. The consultations are held regularly, and there is an exchange of views. As for the communique, in the view of Russian officials, while adoption of a final document is desirable from a protocol standpoint, it is not an absolute requirement for such a format. However one looks at it, the host side can hardly be blamed for the lack of a final communique. The real issues lie deeper.<\/p>\n
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The failure to come up with a statement stems from disagreement between Kabul and Islamabad over how to describe terrorist activity emanating from Afghan territory. At the previous meeting, the same wording was agreed upon without objections. But this year circumstances worked against Moscow. As armed tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated, both sides were far more sensitive to any phrasing that in current circumstances might be interpreted as an attack on their position in the bilateral standoff.The absence of a joint statement is unlikely to have a major impact on the future of the forum itself. The Moscow Format will continue to function as one of the recognized frameworks for discussing Afghanistan-related issues.
\nHowever, the fact that the recent meeting ended without a communique could have a bigger impact on Russia-Pakistan bilateral ties. Until recently, concerns within Pakistan\u2019s ruling circles about Moscow\u2019s growing closeness with Kabul were largely confined to tight-lipped diplomats and a narrow circle of experts. In October, however, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Moscow Format spilled into the public domain with a number of leading Pakistani outlets publishing critical commentary.\u00a0
\nAn editorial by influential newspaper The Dawn, for example, noted that while many other third parties, including Qatar, T\u00fcrkiye, Saudi Arabia, and China \u2013 have tried to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan, \u201cRussia is the only state that recognizes the Taliban regime\u201d and hence could \u201cbe engaged\u201d\u00a0to \u201ctry and give the peace process another chance.\u201d
\nThe Tribune newspaper went even further, suggesting in its report on the talks in Moscow that \u201cwhat raised eyebrows in diplomatic circles was Moscow\u2019s apparent effort to play down the regime\u2019s links with terrorist activities, prompting speculation that changing regional dynamics may be pushing Russia closer to Kabul.\u201d\u00a0
\nThe roots of such reactions in Islamabad, of course, go back not months or years, but decades.
\nOld narratives, ground realities
\nThe idea of the \u2018Great Game\u2019\u00a0inevitably resurfaces whenever discussion turns to Moscow\u2019s dealings with Kabul and the wider region. Repeated use of the term in historical, geopolitical, and geoeconomic debates has diluted its meaning, turning it into something of a buzzword. Yet it remains essential for understanding Pakistan\u2019s reaction to Russia\u2019s policy toward Afghanistan.
\nTo say that Pakistan\u2019s elites have simply inherited the British colonial idea of Russia as an inherently expansionist power would be an oversimplification. Islamabad and Rawalpindi have their own strategic culture and their own worldview, in which Moscow is seen both as an important power center and as a potentially useful partner. But when it comes to Afghanistan, old colonial notions still tend to surface\u00a0\u2013 particularly the belief that Russia seeks to expand its influence in Kabul in order to gain access to the \u2018warm waters\u2019\u00a0of the Indian Ocean (even though this myth conveniently ignores the fact that Russia already has maritime access).<\/p>\n
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This narrative shaped perceptions throughout much of the second half of the 20th century, especially during the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and it has resurfaced in recent years, particularly after the Taliban was recognized as the official Afghan government.
\nOne can point out endlessly that such assumptions bear little relation to reality. Yet century-old narratives are often more durable than arguments grounded in facts. The persistence of this perception is directly linked to the depth of the problems Pakistan faces in its relationship with Afghanistan.
\nFirst, Islamabad has never been able to reconcile itself to the refusal of every Afghan government to recognize the Durand Line, dating back to 1893, the time of British colonial rule in the region, as the official border. (Pakistan does recognize it.)
\nSecond, from the point of view of Islamabad, the porous nature of that border is the main source of terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, which remains the core national security challenge for Pakistan. According to Islamabad\u2019s official line, militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Baluch separatist movements are able to operate only because they can find sanctuary inside Afghanistan. (The Taliban authorities deny harboring the TTP, arguing that the insurgency is a homegrown domestic issue for Pakistan.)\u00a0
\nFinally, and most importantly, Pakistan fears that some third power might aggravate these two problems \u2014 by encouraging Afghan claims on the border and by indirectly supporting anti-Islamabad elements. In Pakistan\u2019s strategic imagination, that role is usually assigned to New Delhi, but in moments of acute crisis\u00a0\u2013 as in the 1970s and 1980s\u00a0\u2013 Moscow can also be cast in the same role.
\nBreaching the differences
\nAllowing the situation to drift to that point is hardly in Moscow\u2019s interests\u00a0\u2013 or in the interests of anyone else in the region. That is why Russian officials and experts continue trying to explain their own reading of events to their Pakistani counterparts.<\/p>\n
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At the official level, Moscow defends its rapidly expanding engagement with the Taliban on two main grounds. First, the current authorities in Kabul are seen as the most reliable partner for counterterrorism. The Taliban have consolidated enough coercive power to prevent a return to full-scale civil war and to establish a relatively stable grip over the country. For the Russian leadership, that makes them a necessary interlocutor in coordinating efforts against ISIS-Khorasan, whose activities threaten not only Russia but also its partners in Central Asia. Second, the authorities in Kabul have shown a willingness to curb drug trafficking, something reflected in data pointing to a decline in opiate production.
\nThe difficulty is that neither argument carries much weight in Pakistan. On the contrary, Islamabad has long had ready-made counterarguments to both. Hance, the conversations end with a counter-question: \u201cWhy are our concerns not being taken into account?\u201d
\nThe answer, once again, seems to lie in differing perceptions \u2013 this time on the Russian side. In Moscow\u2019s strategic worldview, the development of ties with Kabul and the problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan are seen as two different tracks.
\nThe clearest illustration of this is Russia\u2019s own geographical mindset. In Moscow\u2019s view, Afghanistan belongs to Central Asia and is typically treated only as an actor or object affecting the dynamics north of its borders. The Taliban\u2019s policy toward Pakistan is barely discussed. Kabul\u2019s ties with other South Asian countries are also largely ignored. As a result, Afghanistan plays almost no role in Russia\u2019s broader foreign policy planning for South Asia. For observers from the subcontinent, this is surprising, but it reflects a long-established pattern in Russia\u2019s foreign policy theory as well as practice.
\nBroader vision
\nNone of this means that Russia-Pakistan relations are doomed to crash against a wall of mutual misunderstanding and distrust over Afghanistan. Admittedly, Moscow and Islamabad are currently moving in different directions. Russia\u2019s cooperation with Kabul is likely to continue and may well expand into new areas, while the military standoff between Afghanistan and Pakistan is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, with harmful effects on the lives of people along the border.<\/p>\n
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Even so, divergent approaches to Kabul need not lead inevitably to hostility between Russia and Pakistan. Such an outcome would run counter not only to Moscow\u2019s and Islamabad\u2019s own interests but also to those of other regional actors. It could deprive both countries of the benefits of bilateral cooperation and even paralyze the work of the Moscow Format and other regional mechanisms, including the SCO. That would benefit no one.
\nThe first step toward avoiding such a scenario could be to let old, familiar narratives give way to new ways of thinking \u2013 ones that recognize how fundamentally differently the parties can perceive the same problem, and that are ready to accept\u00a0development and peace as indispensable for global progress.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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