Tokyo\u2019s latest clash with Moscow exposes a deeper struggle between national ambition, dependence on Washington, and the need for Russian energy<\/p>\n
A 15-meter-high bronze memorial towers over the Amur River embankment: a Soviet soldier swings his rifle butt, smashing a Japanese border marker bearing the Imperial Chrysanthemum emblem \u2013 a symbol held sacred in Japan.
\nOn September 4 \u2013 the day following Victory Day over Militaristic Japan and the End of WWII (as observed in Russia) \u2013 the Victory in the East memorial was unveiled at the highest point of the Amur River embankment in Khabarovsk. The monument was created at the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with the participation of the Russian Military Historical Society and the government of Khabarovsk Krai. The stone border post is an exact replica of a border stone erected by Japan on Sakhalin after the Russo-Japanese War.
\nThe following day, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi demanded the removal of the monument. The depiction of the smashed chrysanthemum, she wrote on X, was absolutely unacceptable and was an affront to the national sentiments of the Japanese people. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi called the monument \u201cunacceptable\u201d and deeply regrettable, and said that Tokyo would continue to press for its removal.<\/p>\n
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Moscow responded that it would not dismantle or alter the monument. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova even stated that one might as well demand that the wind stop blowing or the sun stop shining.\u00a0
\nBeijing seized the opportunity to remind its neighbor of past crimes: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning advised Japan to learn from history, make a definitive break with militarism, and earn the trust of its neighbors through concrete actions.
\nAt first glance, the situation appears unprecedented. In the span of a single month, the Russian president made a historic visit to Iturup; both sides summoned ambassadors; Japan, the US, and Australia held military exercises just 20 kilometers from the Russian border; and now, there\u2019s the issue with the monument and the demand to tear it down. Media outlets speak of a \u201csharp chill\u201d in relations, a new wave of confrontation in the Russian Far East, and even a potential \u201csecond front\u201d\u00a0of the Cold War.
\nHowever, Russian experts who spoke to RT view the situation differently.
\nA series of coincidences
\nThe situation was triggered not by Russia\u2019s actions, but by the Japanese Ministry of Defense.\u00a0
\nOn August 4, the Cabinet of Japan approved its annual Defense of Japan White Paper \u2013 a record-breaking 598 pages featuring an anime-style cover showing a group of smiling young people against the backdrop of a futuristic city. This year\u2019s theme was \u201cSecurity for the Future.\u201d\u00a0The content of the whitepaper was quite pragmatic, however. China was identified as Japan\u2019s greatest strategic challenge; on this list, China was followed by Russia and North Korea; for the first time, the buildup of military power was directly linked to economic prosperity (hence the peaceful cover design).<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Japan\u00a0Ministry\u00a0of\u00a0Defense <\/p>\n
There is a section on Russian military activity in the Far East: the document notes Tu-95 flights, 214 interceptions of Russian aircraft over the course of the year, the expansion of joint naval patrols with China (in August 2025, a submarine participated in these patrols for the first time), as well as a flight by Russian and Chinese bombers to the area near Shikoku Island in December. There is also a chapter on new methods of warfare, such as the use of mass-produced, low-cost drones and AI in decision-making. For the second consecutive year, the document characterizes Russian military actions in the Southern Kuril Islands as \u201cillegal occupation.\u201d
\nNine days later, on August 13, Vladimir Putin visited Iturup. Throughout his years in office, the Russian president had never visited the southern islands of the Kuril chain, which are also claimed by Japan.<\/p>\n
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Japan\u2019s reaction was immediate. Takaichi called the visit \u201cabsolutely unacceptable,\u201d\u00a0Motegi repeated Tokyo\u2019s position about the islands being an \u201cinherent part of Japanese territory,\u201d\u00a0and the Japanese Foreign Ministry summoned\u00a0Russian Ambassador to Japan Nikolay Nozdrev. Moscow responded firmly, dismissing the statements of Japanese officials as politically irrelevant, offensive, and legally null and void; it reiterated that Iturup, like the rest of the Kurils, is an integral part of Russia, and that Japanese officials have no right to tell Moscow which regions of the country the Russian president may visit.
\nOn August 15, the anniversary of Japan\u2019s surrender in WWII, Takaichi\u00a0sent\u00a0a \u2018tamagushi\u2019 (ritual offering) to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, she refrained from going there personally, and the ruling party clarified that the donation was made from personal funds and in Takaichi\u2019s capacity as LDP leader, rather than as head of government. The gesture was calculated to satisfy the domestic audience, without triggering a diplomatic row with Beijing and Seoul.
\nOn August 18, Japanese Ambassador to Russia Akira Muto was summoned to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin lodged a strong protest regarding statements made by the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister, asserting that Russia\u2019s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Southern Kuril Islands are inviolable, and that any attempts to call this reality into question are unacceptable and illegitimate.
\nOn August 31, another incident occurred, this time involving military exercises. From September 8-24, Japan, the US, and Australia conducted Exercises Orient Shield with some operations taking place on Hokkaido Island, near the Russian border. The Japanese side was informed that provocative military activity near Russia\u2019s Far Eastern borders is absolutely unacceptable; Zakharova specifically noted plans to deploy US land-based Typhon missile systems \u2013 capable of firing medium-and shorter-range missiles \u2013 during the exercises and warned of compensatory countermeasures.<\/p>\n
A new monument to the Soviet victory over Japan in World War II, dedicated in Khabarovsk as part of the Russian-Chinese Forum on September 4, 2026.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0Sputnik \/ Ekaterina Chesnokova <\/p>\n
On September 4, the monument was unveiled in Khabarovsk. That same day, the UN General Assembly voted to adopt the Equal Earth Projection. Japan voted in favor. But a few days later, it demanded a correction: on the online version of the new map, the four Southern Kuril Islands were shaded the same color as the rest of Russia, which Japan found unacceptable.
\nSo there we have it \u2013 six incidents in 30 days. Each incident compounds the previous one, and together they form a picture of rapidly deteriorating relations.
\nBelow, Russian experts analyze the situation.\u00a0<\/p>\n
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\u2018Relations have not cooled suddenly\u2019
\nVasily Shchepkin \u2013 a Japanologist with a PhD in History, senior researcher of the Far East Department at the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an associate professor at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg \u2013 suggests reframing the question.\u00a0
\n\u201cIn my view, relations between Russia and Japan have not cooled suddenly; they have been in this state for over four years, since the start of Russia\u2019s military operation in Ukraine. Japan joined Western sanctions, and everything that has happened over the past four years is largely a consequence of that,\u201d he said.\u00a0
\nTherefore, the rift happened not in September 2026, but in March 2022 \u2013 when Tokyo backed the collective West\u2019s sanctions regime, and Moscow responded by withdrawing from peace treaty negotiations, cancelling visa-free travel for Japanese citizens to the Kuril Islands, and halting dialogue on joint economic activity there. Everything that followed was the consequence of that single decision.
\nSo, what happened in August? According to Shchepkin, the current chain of events was a direct result of Putin\u2019s visit to Iturup. Tokyo\u2019s reaction was inevitable. However, he draws attention to a neglected detail. \u201cAside from statements, no concrete measures have followed so far.\u201d
\nNo actions were undertaken by Japan in September. No new sanctions packages were adopted; diplomats were not expelled, and the remaining projects were not cancelled. As for d\u00e9marches, the summoning of diplomats, and declarations of unacceptable behavior, all this is standard diplomatic procedure.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the founder of the Gidrostroy group of companies, Alexander Verkhovsky, visit the Yasny fish processing complex on Iturup Island, Sakhalin Region, Russia on August 13, 2026.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0Sputnik \/ Gavriil Grigorov <\/p>\n
\u201cNeither Tokyo nor Moscow seeks to aggravate relations further,\u201d Shchepkin says. \u201cIn my view, [relations] are unlikely to deteriorate further, because, speaking of bilateral interaction, neither side wants to halt it or escalate tensions.\u201d
\nTherefore, we may conclude that Russia-Japan relations, in their current form, are a dependent variable.\u00a0
\n\u201cThe current state of relations is rather a consequence of other events, which are not directly tied to the Russian-Japanese agenda,\u201d the expert says.\u00a0<\/p>\n
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An independent bilateral agenda no longer exists; therefore, we may only speak of the global situation and how it relates to Russia\u2019s Far East.\u00a0
\n\u201cWe are currently in a sort of deadlock which we return to whenever the global situation gets worse \u2013 and particularly when relations between Russia and the US deteriorate,\u201d the expert says. \u201cThe US has long been the \u2018third force\u2019 on which Russia-Japan relations largely depended.\u201d
\nWho started it?
\nWhile it\u2019s true that relations are frozen, there is no consensus among the parties on who is to blame for this. Russian experts, however, have a clear opinion.\u00a0
\nOlga Bonch-Osmolovskaya, a Japanologist with a PhD in History, describes the reasons behind Tokyo\u2019s decision. According to her, after 2022, Japan\u2019s policy ceased to be truly independent. But that is only part of the story.
\n\u201cIt is one thing to politically condemn a distant war and state one\u2019s position for the sake of appearances, given the existence of a sort of \u2018suzerain\u2019; it is quite another to actively integrate oneself into the corresponding policy,\u201d she says. Japan chose the latter option. And it did so with particular zeal.\u00a0
\n\u201cDriven by what one might call the \u2018straight-A student complex\u2019 of the Japanese and their tendency to be highly conscientious, sometimes even fanatical in executing tasks, Japan closely aligned itself with this course, joining the full package of sanctions against Moscow and withdrawing from various forms of cooperation,\u201d Bonch-Osmolovskaya says.<\/p>\n
Service members of the Australian Army, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, US Army participate in the closing ceremony for Exercise Orient Shield ’26 in Hokkaido, Japan, on September 24, 2026.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0Legion-Media \/ Alamy \/ piemags \/ news <\/p>\n
The former policy \u2013 one that allowed Tokyo to balance between allied obligations and its own interests in the north \u2013 was curtailed. Along with it, all the achievements of the previous decade came to naught.
\n\u201cRussia did not initiate the deterioration of relations with Japan,\u201d Bonch-Osmolovskaya says. \u201cIt responded and continues to respond to Japanese sanctions and to the increased US military presence.\u201d
\nThere is a fine line between words and capabilities, however. Take Exercises Orient Shield, for example. \u201cDuring the exercises, all sorts of maneuvers are practiced \u2013 the landing of troops, the transfer of ammunition, the deployment of HIMARS systems, air defense systems, etc.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n
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This explains Russia\u2019s strong reaction.\u00a0\u201cOf course, no one is saying that this is literally preparation for an attack on the Kuril Islands. But Russia is obliged to evaluate not only statements, but military capabilities,\u201d Bonch-Osmolovskaya says.
\nIntentions change along with governments, but military infrastructure remains. And military officials all over the world take this into account.
\nThe result is a vicious circle: Japan builds up its military potential jointly with the US; in response, Russia strengthens its position in the Far East; then, Tokyo presents this strengthening as an additional justification for further militarization. And the circle repeats itself.\u00a0
\nThis is confirmed by Japan\u2019s military spending. Japan crossed the 2% defense spending threshold ahead of schedule, a year earlier than the mark outlined in the 2022 strategy. For the current fiscal year, defense spending amounted to a record 8.8 trillion yen, and the request for the next year is already a record 8.9 trillion yen (about $56 billion). In June, the parliament renamed the Air Self-Defense Force into the Air and Space Self-Defense Force; this was the first renaming of one of the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces since their creation in 1954. In August, Takaichi announced further changes: the creation of a Space Operations Group, a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) satellite, and the expansion of the Okinawa Ground Self-Defense Force\u2019s 15th Brigade into a division.
\nThese actions are mainly directed against Beijing. But considering the geography, they are also directed against Moscow.\u00a0<\/p>\n
The 1st Airborne Brigade of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces conducts training on January 12, 2025, at Camp Narashino in Chiba Prefecture, Japan.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 David Mareuil \/ Anadolu via Getty Images <\/p>\n
Energy instead of diplomacy
\nDespite all this, there is something that balances the dramatic picture. While diplomats are exchanging demarches, gas carriers are departing from Sakhalin and transporting LNG to Japan.\u00a0
\nThe Sakhalin-2 project survived sanctions, frozen political dialogue, and demands to dismantle the monument. In June, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control once again extended the special license until December 18, 2026. Such an exception has been issued annually since 2022, and each time it was preceded by negotiations between Tokyo and Washington. Russian LNG, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, provided about 9% of Japanese liquefied gas imports in 2025; According to Bonch-Osmolovskaya, the inverse relationship is even stronger \u2013 Japan accounted for about 58% of the project\u2019s exports.<\/p>\n
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Vladimir Nelidov \u2013 PhD in History, associate professor of the Department of Oriental Studies at MGIMO, Senior Researcher at the Center for Japanese Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and RIAC expert\u00a0\u2013 considers this to be the main reason why the threats didn\u2019t go beyond words.
\n\u201cSevering diplomatic relations would be disproportionate,\u201d he says. \u201cThe possibilities for introducing additional economic sanctions are also limited: Japan does not have much leverage. For example, it remains involved in Sakhalin oil and gas projects and, I believe, is not ready to sacrifice them.\u201d
\nNotably, the US administration insisted on Japan\u2019s withdrawal from the Sakhalin projects. However, Tokyo remained. \u201cAs far as we can judge, Takaichi either convinced the US or insisted [on doing things her way] and so, despite the position of its senior ally, Japan remained in the projects.\u201d
\nThe second possible lever is humanitarian. Tokyo tries to preserve it, too. \u201cThe Japanese side has invested a lot of effort in humanitarian cooperation with Russia. Before the current escalation, the Japanese even proudly said that, despite the lack of political dialogue, cultural festivals and other events continue between the countries.\u201d And Nelidov adds, \u201cin the long term, Japan has perhaps more need for such contacts than Russia.\u201d
\nShchepkin supports this idea, adding that even in the past four years, and thanks to the efforts of the pro-Russia lobby within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, cooperation has been preserved in areas like culture, education, and tourism. The current flow of Russian tourists to Japan, the expert adds, is largely a legacy of the Shinzo Abe administration, when the parties agreed to put the territorial issue aside and focus on the economy, culture, and visas.<\/p>\n
A composite photo shows Vasily Shchepkin, Olga Bonch-Osmolovskaya, and Vladimir Nelidov.<\/p>\n
The general picture is quite clear. Bonch-Osmolovskaya calls it \u201ccold peace\u201d and warns that a complete rupture of relations would not benefit either country: while Japan could technically replace Sakhalin gas, doing so would require time, money, and even greater dependence on US suppliers, whereas Russia would lose revenue from the project. \u201cA definitive break, should it occur, would come at too high a price for both sides,\u201d she says.
\nTherefore, the limit to how far relations can deteriorate is not determined by diplomacy. It is dictated by the energy balance, and this applies to both parties.
\nWhy Takaichi could not remain silent
\nA pressing question remains: why did the Japanese Prime Minister issue all these loud statements if no concrete measures were to follow?<\/p>\n
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Nelidov suggests viewing the situation through the eyes of the Japanese leadership to better understand their logic. Sanae Takaichi rose to power as a nationalist politician and, among other things, a defender of national honor. Her policy is grounded in this.\u00a0
\n\u201cHad she failed to react to the Russian president\u2019s visit to the territory claimed by Japan, to the installation of the monument \u2013 which [Russia] views as fine, necessary, and valuable, but which the Japanese see as a desecration of a state symbol \u2013 or to the military exercises, she would have been torn apart, figuratively speaking, by her own party,\u201d the expert says.
\nFor example, when the US administration imposed sanctions against the International Criminal Court \u2013 including its presiding judge, Japanese national Tomoko Akane \u2013 Takaichi faced criticism for not standing up for her compatriot firmly enough. \u201cIf public opinion and fellow party members demand decisive action from her even in dealings with the US, then what would they say about Russia?\u201d
\nA scenario in which Tokyo would have remained silent to avoid damaging relations with Moscow is virtually impossible.\u00a0
\nValery Kistanov, head of the Center for Japanese Studies at the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, drew attention to the details of the protest against the monument in Khabarovsk. Takaichi posted her comment on social media but did not issue an official statement, and major Japanese media outlets (except for right-wing conservative publications) barely covered the story. It didn\u2019t cause a nationwide outcry.<\/p>\n
Sanae Takaichi, the then newly-elected leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), attends a press conference on October 4, 2025 in Tokyo, Japan.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Yuichi Yamazaki – Pool \/ Getty Images <\/p>\n
In other words, the statement was addressed not to Moscow, but to fellow party members and the segment of the Japanese electorate for whom the events of 1945 remain an enduring historical wound. The offering made at Yasukuni on August 15 followed the same logic: made from personal funds and without Takaichi herself present, it was intended as a signal to the domestic audience, but was carefully calibrated to avoid provoking a new crisis in relations with Beijing.
\nThe fact that the series of incidents was not followed by any practical actions holds the key to understanding the events of September. This means that a large part of what happened did not concern bilateral relations but was intended for domestic audiences.\u00a0
\nHowever, this does not render the situation entirely harmless. Symbolic commitments tend to become entrenched: a prime minister who has demanded the dismantling of a monument cannot refute their own statement, and a successor would have to start from the same position.<\/p>\n
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Who benefits?
\nExperts agree on who benefits from the conflict, though they differ on the implications. \u201cIt is clear that the US is the primary beneficiary,\u201d says Bonch-Osmolovskaya. \u201cThe worse relations between Moscow and Tokyo become, the stronger Japan\u2019s existing dependence on the US grows in all aspects: weaponry, intelligence, supplies, and security guarantees.\u201d Washington gains a disciplined ally, additional bases for the deployment of forces, and another tool for exerting pressure on the Russian Far East.
\nHowever, she adds, \u201cIt is important not to reduce the situation to a scenario where the US is some sort of \u2018dark empire\u2019 and Japan is merely its puppet.\u201d
\nIn Japan, there are certain beneficiaries of this confrontation as well. Among the proponents of revising post-war restrictions is the defense establishment, which Bonch-Osmolovskaya characterizes as revanchist and nationalistic, and arms manufacturers, for whom expanded exports open up markets that had been closed for nearly 80 years. The image of an external threat serves as a mechanism for legitimization: the longer the list of threats, the easier it is for the parliament to increase military spending and lift export restrictions.\u00a0
\nBonch-Osmolovskaya gives a rather harsh assessment and makes a historical analogy. She believes that the current propaganda is reminiscent of the decades preceding WWII, when Japan designated China as its primary adversary and demonized it; today, a similar process is unfolding regarding Russia. At the root of this, she sees the unresolved trauma of 1945: while the cult of the emperor was formally dismantled and the atrocities of the military machine were acknowledged, the defeat was never truly accepted, and strategic sovereignty was lost.<\/p>\n
People gather to celebrate Japanese Emperor Naruhito’s 66th birthday at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Japan on February 23, 2026.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 David Mareuil \/ Anadolu via Getty Images <\/p>\n
Nelidov takes a more measured approach, offering a different view that does not suggest malicious intent. The problem, he believes, is the so-called \u2018security dilemma\u2019 \u2013 a long-standing concept in international relations theory. A state strengthens its defenses; its neighbors, unaware of its true intentions, interpret this as preparation for aggression and arm themselves in response; the first state observes these preparations and continues its military buildup. \u201cThe paradox of the security dilemma is that in seeking to protect itself, the state ultimately finds itself in an even more dangerous situation,\u201d he explains.
\nAnother factor also comes into play. \u201cMost Japanese diplomats, politicians, and even military officials have no desire to develop an independent view of the global situation,\u201d Nelidov says, describing Japanese political circles as highly compliant pupils of the West; the few who acknowledge that the situation in Ukraine might be more complex than the prevailing narrative risk becoming outcasts. These sentiments did not emerge in 2022; they were shaped throughout the post-war period by the media and the education system, initially as anti-Soviet views. In Japanese opinion polls, Russia consistently ranks low in terms of public favorability, alongside China and North Korea.<\/p>\n
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Freezing point
\nIf the current situation resembles \u2018freezing point\u2019, it is logical to ask what might drive the relations between Japan and Russia below freezing.\u00a0
\nBonch-Osmolovskaya mentions a specific threshold. \u201cThe next stage of deterioration could be the deployment of US long-range systems in Japan,\u201d she says. Russia\u2019s reaction would be predictable: a further military buildup on the Kuril Islands and in Sakhalin. A further contraction of economic ties is also likely; she believes that the fishing industry would suffer first, followed by what remains of trade.
\nBonch-Osmolovskaya does not predict a direct military conflict. According to her, if it were to occur at all, it would happen only as part of a larger clash between Russia and the US or a major crisis surrounding Taiwan that dragged in all the neighboring states. In other words, a Russo-Japanese war is impossible as a standalone event \u2013 it could only be an episode within someone else\u2019s war.
\nNelidov views the situation somewhat differently. He points out that Japan\u2019s defense policy identifies China and North Korea as the primary threats, with Russia ranking third on the list. But even when it comes to China and North Korea, it\u2019s not about direct confrontation but rather an arms race. While this is certainly a negative phenomenon, it is fundamentally different from a direct conflict.\u00a0
\nThe comparison the expert draws with Europe is interesting. He considers the rhetoric of Berlin, London, Helsinki, and Stockholm far more threatening than that of Tokyo, which demonstrates \u201cvirtually no real readiness for aggressive action against Russia.\u201d He is convinced there are certain limits the Japanese side will not cross.<\/p>\n
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz greets Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at the G20 Summit on November 22, 2025 in Johannesburg, South Africa.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Leon Neal \/ Getty Images <\/p>\n
He attributes East Asia\u2019s greater reluctance to engage in direct conflict to accumulated experience: territorial disputes and mutual historical grievances are common in the region, and the elites have learned to manage such crises. For example, following Takaichi\u2019s November statement regarding potential intervention in Taiwan, Tokyo\u2019s relations with Beijing plummeted to their lowest point in a decade, and China imposed economic restrictions; yet within a few months, the situation had stabilized.
\n\u201cIn East Asia, I don\u2019t see the kind of crazy Russophobia and readiness to direct all resources into the conflict that we\u2019re witnessing in Europe,\u201d says Nelidov. \u201cJapan doesn\u2019t intend to go to war with Russia; and neither does Russia want war with Japan. Both sides realize it is not in their interests. There are no strategically vital or fundamental contradictions between them.\u201d<\/p>\n
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Is there a way to achieve a thaw in relations? All three experts agree that there is no simple solution. Normalizing bilateral ties is impossible until relations between Russia and the West are normalized; the Japanese leadership lacks both the will and the capacity to adopt an independent stance. However, Shchepkin believes that once the conflict in Ukraine ends, Tokyo will be among the first to act: as soon as the sanctions regime is lifted or minimized, Japan will be ready to soften its position and resume dialogue.
\nHowever, the opinions of experts diverge when it comes to assessing the current pause in relations. For Nelidov, it is merely another fluctuation in a long history of regional squabbles. For Bonch-Osmolovskaya, it represents a deeper rift: Russia is asserting itself as an independent civilization, while Japan, in response, is becoming increasingly integrated into the US system of control over Eurasia. She advocates neither for reconciliation at any cost nor for territorial concessions, but rather for maintaining energy, economic, and cultural ties as a bridge \u2013 \u201cnot so much with the Japan of today, but with the Japan that might one day become more independent.\u201d
\nAs Bonch-Osmolovskaya concludes, \u201cJapan cannot simultaneously be an independent civilization and America\u2019s forward military outpost. It will have to make a choice.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Tokyo\u2019s latest clash with Moscow exposes a deeper struggle between national ambition, dependence on Washington, and the need for Russian energy A 15-meter-high bronze memorial towers over the Amur River…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":39136,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"rop_custom_images_group":[],"rop_custom_messages_group":[],"rop_publish_now":"initial","rop_publish_now_accounts":[],"rop_publish_now_history":[],"rop_publish_now_status":"pending","footnotes":""},"categories":[4,6,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39135","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economy","category-environment","category-politics"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t