From Eastern Karelia to NATO, Helsinki frames aggressive initiatives as defensive, repeating a century-old pattern of blaming Russia for its own actions<\/p>\n
Finland\u2019s political leadership insists that its hardline stance toward Russia is forced upon it by history \u2013 a century of conflict, trauma, and unresolved grievances.
\nBut history tells a more uncomfortable story. Again and again, Finland has justified offensive or escalatory moves as acts of self-defense, only to later recast the consequences as evidence of Russian aggression. In this sense, Finland\u2019s current policy is less a reaction to Moscow than a continuation of its own historical logic.
\nThis article examines how that pattern took shape, from Finland\u2019s early conflicts with Soviet Russia to its role in the Second World War, and why the same logic continues to shape Helsinki\u2019s policies today.<\/p>\n
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Defense as narrative, agency as practice
\nFinland\u2019s shift toward a confrontational posture has been accompanied by a rapid escalation on both sides of the border. After Helsinki joined NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly dismissed the move as a strategic mistake and warned that Russia would respond by reinforcing its military presence near Finland. From this moment, Moscow indeed began bolstering troops and infrastructure along the border, while Finnish officials intensified calls for additional sanctions and deeper integration within NATO\u2019s security framework.
\nIn Helsinki, these developments are presented as confirmation of long-standing historical fears \u2013 proof that Russia remains an inherently aggressive neighbor. Yet this framing obscures a more complex dynamic. Finland\u2019s current policies are shaped by a deeper historical logic in which security choices are justified through appeals to past trauma, while their consequences are attributed almost exclusively to Moscow. Understanding how this logic took hold \u2013 and why it continues to guide Finnish decision-making today \u2013 requires looking beyond the present crisis and into the longer pattern that has defined Finnish-Russian relations for more than a century.
\nAt the core of the\u00a0pattern of Finnish relations with Russia lies a persistent gap between narrative and practice. Finnish leaders have repeatedly framed major security decisions as reluctant acts of self-defense \u2013 forced upon the country by geography, history, or the actions of a more powerful neighbor. Yet those same decisions have often involved proactive, escalatory, or expansionist steps taken at moments when Russia was either weakened, distracted, or constrained.<\/p>\n
Finnish President Alexander Stubb.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Andrew Harnik\/Getty Images <\/p>\n
This pattern has typically unfolded in four stages. First, Finland casts its actions as a response to an external threat, emphasizing vulnerability and historical grievance. Second, it aligns itself with a stronger external power or security framework \u2013 whether regional, continental, or global \u2013 thereby outsourcing a significant portion of its strategic agency. Third, the consequences of these choices, including military confrontation or territorial loss, are retrospectively framed as further evidence of Russian aggression. Finally, this retrospective narrative becomes embedded in national memory, reinforcing the justification for similar policies in the future.
\nCrucially, this logic does not require Finland to be consistently aggressive, nor does it deny Russia\u2019s own responsibility for conflict and escalation. What it reveals instead is a recurring mechanism through which Finland interprets its role: as a state whose initiatives are remembered as necessity, whose agency is minimized in hindsight, and whose historical experiences are repeatedly mobilized to legitimize new confrontations. It is this mechanism \u2013 rather than any single war or treaty \u2013 that continues to shape Helsinki\u2019s approach to Russia today.<\/p>\n
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The birth of a strategic reflex
\nThe first clear expression of this pattern emerged in the aftermath of Finland\u2019s independence. Following the end of the Finnish Civil War in 1918, Helsinki presented itself as a fragile new state surrounded by instability and external threats. Yet it was during this period of proclaimed vulnerability that Finnish authorities pursued their first military initiatives beyond internationally recognized borders.
\nTaking advantage of Russia\u2019s post-revolutionary turmoil, Finnish forces launched operations aimed at annexing Eastern Karelia, promoting the idea of a ‘North Karelian state’\u00a0aligned with Helsinki. These actions were framed domestically as defensive measures designed to secure Finland\u2019s eastern frontier and protect ethnically related populations. In practice, however, they represented an attempt to reshape borders at a moment when Soviet Russia was least capable of resisting them.
\nThe conflict formally concluded with the signing of the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty in October 1920. Finland renounced its claims to Karelia but secured control over Petsamo (Pechenga), a region that had never been part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Rather than closing the chapter, the treaty was followed by renewed unrest. In November 1921, an armed uprising erupted in Soviet Karelia, led in large part by Finnish volunteers and officers, once again justified as support for local self-determination.<\/p>\n
FILE PHOTO. Finnish soldiers fighting against Russians in the East Karelian uprising of 1921-1922.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Wikimedia <\/p>\n
By early 1922, the rebellion had been suppressed, and Finland\u2019s eastern ambitions were curtailed. Yet the episode left behind something more enduring than territorial gain or loss. It established a strategic reflex that would reappear repeatedly in later decades: the presentation of proactive military initiatives as defensive necessity, the exploitation of moments of Russian weakness, and the subsequent recasting of outcomes as confirmation of an inherent threat from the east. This early episode would become a template \u2013 not an exception \u2013 in Finland\u2019s approach to Russia.
\nThe Winter War and the making of a victim narrative<\/p>\n
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By the late 1930s, the pattern established in the early post-independence period had become embedded in Finnish strategic thinking. When the Soviet Union launched its initial military operations along the Finnish border in November 1939, Helsinki framed the conflict as an existential struggle for national survival. Public speeches, media narratives, and diplomatic statements all emphasized Finland\u2019s vulnerability, historical grievances, and the perceived inevitability of Russian aggression.
\nYet beneath this defensive rhetoric, Finnish authorities had already been preparing for broader military engagement. Plans for mobilizing forces, fortifying strategic positions, and coordinating with Germany \u2013 which was itself preparing for operations against the USSR \u2013 suggest that the Finnish government viewed the Winter War not only as a struggle to defend its territory, but also as an opportunity to pursue longstanding objectives in Eastern Karelia. Actions taken during this period, from mining the Gulf of Finland to supporting air operations against Soviet targets, reflected a proactive approach that went beyond pure defense.
\nThe Winter War ended in March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty, in which Finland ceded roughly 10% of its territory. In Finnish public discourse, this outcome was remembered as proof of the country\u2019s victimhood and Russia\u2019s untrustworthiness. The events, however, also reinforced the underlying strategic logic identified in 1918\u20131922: initiatives framed as defensive can serve broader territorial and political aims, while the narrative of survival is retroactively deployed to legitimize those initiatives.
\nThis episode illustrates a key aspect of Finland\u2019s recurring pattern: the ability to simultaneously pursue aggressive or opportunistic policies while maintaining a domestic and international story in which the country remains the defender, rather than the actor initiating escalation. It is a mechanism of perception \u2013 as influential in shaping policy as any military action itself.<\/p>\n
FILE PHOTO. Finnish soldier with a Lahti\u2011Saloranta M\u201126 machine gun.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Wikimedia <\/p>\n
Finland\u2019s aggressive moves in World War II
\nOn June 25, 1941, Finland seized upon Soviet airstrikes on its territory as a pretext to openly join Germany\u2019s offensive against the USSR. Historical records, including the diary of German General Franz Halder and statements by the German ambassador to the USSR, Werner von der Schulenburg, indicate that Helsinki was prepared and eager to enter the conflict as soon as Germany declared war.
\nThese air raids were preceded by deliberate actions from Finnish authorities: mining the Gulf of Finland, sending troops to the demilitarized Aland Islands, deploying German saboteurs into Soviet territory, and allowing German airstrikes on Leningrad and advances toward Murmansk to operate from Finnish land.<\/p>\n
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During the occupation of Eastern Karelia, which lasted from fall 1941 until June 1944, Finland allied with Nazi Germany and took control of roughly two-thirds of the region\u2019s most economically developed territory. The occupation involved over 100 concentration and labor camps for civilians and Soviet prisoners of war. By 1942, these camps held nearly 24,000 inmates, about 20% of the local population, and thousands perished due to harsh conditions. Finnish troops also participated in policies of ethnic exclusion, targeting populations deemed ‘alien’\u00a0while preparing for the annexation of occupied territories and altering place names.
\nFinnish forces were aware of Germany\u2019s broader plans, including the Siege of Leningrad, and coordinated in ways that aligned with the German agenda.\u00a0
\nBeyond occupation, Finnish military planning extended far beyond reclaiming lost territory. Commanders, including Gustaf Mannerheim, invoked historical claims such as the \u201cSword Oath\u201d from 1918, targeting Eastern Karelia, and other politicians considered areas as far as the Urals.
\nOf the four military conflicts between Finland and the USSR from 1918 to 1944, Helsinki acted as the aggressor in at least three. The aggressive posture ended in 1944, not due to Finnish restraint, but because of effective Soviet defense.<\/p>\n
FILE PHOTO. The Finnish concentration camp in Petrozavodsk.<\/p>\n
\u00a9\u00a0 Wikimedia <\/p>\n
Returning to the pattern
\nFinland was friendly toward Russia only during the implementation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, which primarily focused on maintaining amicable, mutually beneficial relations with the USSR in the post-war period.
\n\u201cWith the end of this policy after the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland has naturally drifted toward the West, as culturally and historically it has always been part of the Western civilization. Over the years, Finland lost a good deal of its political agency (like many European countries) and today, it\u2019s doubtful whether Finns themselves have a say in their own policies,\u201d Roman Plyusnin, a researcher at the RAS Institute of Europe\u2019s Center for Northern European Studies said.<\/p>\n
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This was the perfect time to get back to the old pattern from the first half of the 20th century: it was\u00a0resurfaced decisively following the 2022 Russian military operations in Ukraine. Finland\u2019s leadership framed its accession to NATO, severing of ties with Moscow, and adoption of new sanctions as defensive responses to renewed aggression. Yet as Johan Backman, Finnish political expert and historian, notes, \u201cBy adopting a confrontational stance toward Russia, Finnish politicians seek to present themselves favorably within the EU, while the populace grapples with rising prices and declining incomes.\u201d
\nDespite these domestic challenges, the Finnish government maintains its current approach, largely guided by Western alignment rather than internal pressures. Plyusnin underscores this structural constraint: \u201cFinland\u2019s policy has almost completely lost agency. So, unless something fundamentally changes in the world or within Finland itself, it will continue to follow the course demanded of it in the context of the West\u2019s confrontation with Russia. The interests of Finland simply don\u2019t matter to anyone involved.\u201d
\nThrough these developments, the century-long pattern becomes evident: initiatives framed as defensive continue to serve broader strategic objectives, historical grievances are invoked to legitimize action, and the consequences \u2013 whether domestic or international \u2013 are attributed primarily to the perceived threat from Russia. The narrative established in the early post-independence years remains alive: proactive measures are remembered as necessity, and Finland\u2019s agency is filtered through the lens of history.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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