{"id":26424,"date":"2026-01-16T23:36:14","date_gmt":"2026-01-16T20:36:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mongolianews.mn\/?p=26424"},"modified":"2026-01-16T23:36:14","modified_gmt":"2026-01-16T20:36:14","slug":"dmitry-trenin-russia-and-the-eu-drift-toward-an-undeclared-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mongolianews.mn\/?p=26424","title":{"rendered":"Dmitry Trenin: Russia and the EU drift toward an undeclared war"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A cautious forecast of what international relations will look like in 2026<\/p>\n<p>            Experience shows that making predictions even a year ahead is risky. Events that later seem obvious can be invisible in advance. Yet trying to identify the main trends shaping world politics remains worthwhile. So, what will the international system look like in 2026?<br \/>\nUkraine: The war will not end<br \/>\nA peace agreement on Ukraine that would satisfy Russia is unlikely in 2026. Western European ruling elites, supported by the US Democratic Party and what is often called the \u2018deep state\u2019,\u00a0will likely block Donald Trump\u2019s efforts to reach a settlement acceptable to Moscow. Moreover, Trump himself may harden his position for domestic political reasons: tightening sanctions on energy exports and stepping up measures against the alleged Russian \u2018shadow fleet\u2019.<br \/>\nUnder such conditions, the Kremlin\u2019s \u2018special diplomatic operation\u2019,\u00a0ongoing since early 2025, may have to be curtailed, while the military operation continues with renewed intensity.<br \/>\nFighting will likely persist throughout 2026. Russian forces will continue advancing and may reclaim additional parts of the Donetsk People\u2019s Republic and Zaporozhye Region that remain under Ukrainian control. Russia will expand buffer zones in the Kharkov and Sumy directions, with possible advances elsewhere.<\/p>\n<p>        Read more<\/p>\n<p>            Fyodor Lukyanov: The West gambled on Russia\u2019s defeat, and trapped itself instead<\/p>\n<p>The Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to retreat. But EU military and financial support, combined with expanded mobilization inside Ukraine, will allow Kiev to stabilize the front and prevent collapse.<br \/>\nAt the same time, the conflict will become more brutal. A desperate adversary is likely to attempt bloody provocations intended to destabilize Russian society psychologically. Moscow\u2019s restraint \u2013 guided by the principle \u201cwe are at war with the regime, not the people\u201d \u2013 may be interpreted in Kiev not as moral discipline, but as weakness. This will encourage increasingly daring actions, forcing Russia to abandon certain taboos.<br \/>\nThe theater of confrontation will also broaden beyond Ukraine and Russia. Anonymous attacks on tankers carrying Russian oil, as well as strikes deep behind enemy lines, will likely be met with covert retaliatory sabotage against European states participating in the proxy war against Russia. Joint actions by Ukrainians and Western Europeans could have more serious consequences, provoking responses beyond Ukrainian territory. The undeclared Russia-EU war will intensify, though a direct, large-scale military clash remains unlikely in 2026.<br \/>\nKiev: Regime continuity, possible leadership change<br \/>\nThe current regime in Kiev will likely remain in place through 2026. But a change of leadership is possible. Zelensky could be forced out through a corruption scandal or political maneuvering. In that scenario he may be replaced by a heavyweight such as General Valery Zaluzhny. Or, more likely, by Kirill Budanov, who is on Russia\u2019s list of terrorists and extremists but is considered more flexible.<br \/>\nUkraine will come under even deeper Western European control. Conditions inside the country will continue to worsen, though the population will not yet experience a mass \u2018sobering-up\u2019. The most active part of Ukrainian society remains sharply anti-Russian.<\/p>\n<p>        Read more<\/p>\n<p>            Why Washington will take Greenland<\/p>\n<p>The West of Europe: Liberal globalism, but limited capacity<br \/>\nWestern Europe will remain a stronghold of liberal globalism. Despite growing unpopularity, the governments of Britain, Germany and France will likely manage to stay in power through 2026. The \u2018change of elites\u2019\u00a0that some believe necessary for normalization with Russia will not happen soon, if it happens at all.<br \/>\nThe EU are UK are not preparing for war with Russia in the classic sense. Rather, they are preparing for a long military confrontation modelled on the Cold War. This confrontation, framed as defending \u201cEuropean freedom and civilization from Russian barbarism,\u201d\u00a0has already become the EU\u2019s principal unifying narrative. It will likely endure through 2026.<br \/>\nYet Western Europe\u2019s practical militarization will probably lag behind last year\u2019s grand declarations. EU states face fiscal constraints. They must compensate for Washington\u2019s unwillingness to fund Ukraine directly. And governments know that cutting social spending sharply risks voter revolt. These realities will restrain militaristic zeal.<br \/>\nThe \u2018dissidence\u2019 inside the EU \u2013\u00a0spanning much of the old Austro-Hungarian space \u2013 will persist, whatever the outcome of Hungary\u2019s spring elections. But its influence will remain limited.<br \/>\nMore important is America\u2019s evolving geopolitical reorientation toward the Western Hemisphere and East Asia. Washington\u2019s skepticism about EU integration and NATO enlargement could create a leadership vacuum in Europe, exposing contradictions between European states that were long suppressed but never resolved.<\/p>\n<p>        Read more<\/p>\n<p>            Disorder instead of protest: Who tried to radicalize Iran\u2019s streets \u2013 and why it failed<\/p>\n<p>America: Trump\u2019s peak, and his limits<br \/>\nThe United States will celebrate the 250th anniversary of independence in 2026, hosting the G20 summit and the FIFA World Cup. These events will highlight Trump\u2019s global stature. But his political influence may weaken as Republicans likely lose their House majority in the midterm elections and as divisions deepen between MAGA forces and the traditional party elite.<br \/>\nTrump will not receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He will appear increasingly aged and erratic. The 2028 nomination battles will begin inside both parties. Polarization will grow sharper, though it will not turn into a new American civil war.<br \/>\nTrump\u2019s January operation against Venezuela reinforced his National Security Strategy: the Western Hemisphere is the priority. Venezuela may not be the end of it. By 2026, leftist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua could also face pressure. Colombia and Mexico may become targets of destabilization.<br \/>\nTrump may attempt to establish full American control over Greenland. Canada will not become part of the US, but Washington will increase pressure on Ottawa to align strictly with American policy. Canada will be unable to \u201cshelter under the EU.\u201d<br \/>\nTrump\u2019s Western Hemisphere focus will damage Russia\u2019s reputation if Washington moves against Cuba, though there will be no second Caribbean crisis. At the same time, this reorientation may weaken Washington\u2019s interest in Ukraine.<br \/>\nMiddle East: Iran remains the main risk<br \/>\nIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled that Israel will address security threats not only on its borders, but more broadly. Iran remains a central concern, especially its missile capabilities. Netanyahu will count on Trump\u2019s support.<br \/>\nEncouraged by the operation against Maduro, Washington could support Israel in a military action targeting Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure. As in the 12-day war last June, planners may calculate that Iranian air defenses cannot provide reliable protection. And that Russia and China will limit themselves to diplomatic condemnation.<\/p>\n<p>        Read more<\/p>\n<p>            Crises, competition and conflict: What\u2019s in store for the Middle East in 2026?<\/p>\n<p>Iran will remain internally tense in 2026. At the top, the succession struggle around the supreme leader will intensify. At the bottom, economic frustration could fuel mass protests. A crisis, possibly already in 2026, could trigger a reformatting of the regime: a larger role for the security forces (IRGC) and reduced influence for clerical structures. Iran will still pursue regional power status, but its revolutionary drive could weaken.<br \/>\nChina: Military build-up, but Taiwan crisis unlikely<br \/>\nChina will strengthen military capabilities in nuclear forces, missiles, naval power and air power\u00a0\u2013 seeking parity with the US and regional superiority in the Western Pacific. Relations with Washington will continue deteriorating, but a Taiwan crisis escalating into armed conflict remains unlikely in 2026.<br \/>\nAs Sino-American relations worsen, so will China\u2019s relations with Japan. Tokyo is increasingly prepared to militarize and to act more autonomously, no longer relying on automatic US protection. This could include a willingness to develop nuclear weapons independently if necessary. A process that, if political decisions were made, could take months, perhaps even weeks.<br \/>\nKorea: Deterrence stabilizes the peninsula<br \/>\nNorth Korea will strengthen nuclear and missile capabilities while deepening ties with Russia and China. US alliances with Japan and South Korea will be counterbalanced by the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alignment. Even so, a major military confrontation on the peninsula remains unlikely.<br \/>\nRussia\u2019s neighbors: Integration, pragmatism, distancing<br \/>\nRussia and Belarus will deepen military integration inside the Union State, including nuclear elements. Minsk\u2019s ability to maintain a multi-vector policy will narrow as Western Europe grows more hostile and Trump\u2019s own position weakens.<br \/>\nMoldova is unlikely to initiate a military conflict with Transnistria. More likely, Brussels will seek deals with the local elite to weaken ties with Russia. Transnistria\u2019s final fate will depend on the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, which will not be decided in 2026.<\/p>\n<p>        Read more<\/p>\n<p>            Gaza, Venezuela, Ukraine: The fault lines shaping 2026<\/p>\n<p>In Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan\u2019s party will likely win June elections and continue drifting toward the West while keeping economically profitable links with Russia. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will remain under the control of Washington, Ankara, Brussels, and London. A new flare-up is unlikely in 2026. Moscow will maintain cold but functional relations with Baku, while continuing pragmatic dialogue with Tbilisi.<br \/>\nCentral Asia will deepen relations with Russia, but primarily as business. At the same time, the region will cultivate multi-vector policies and new identities portraying their imperial and Soviet past as a temporary deviation. This will gradually distance them from Russia.<br \/>\nThe \u2018Collective West\u2019\u00a0and the \u2018Global Majority\u2019: Illusions and reality<br \/>\nSince last year, \u2018Collective West\u2019\u00a0increasingly refers to a civilizational bloc rather than a formal political structure. The shift in US policy from empire to metropolis deprives Europe of the privileged role it enjoyed during the Cold War. Western Europe is changing from a protected and nurtured partner into a resource for \u2018Great America\u2019.<br \/>\nNATO will remain an instrument of American control. The EU is increasingly described in Washington not as a pillar, but as a hindrance. This invites comparisons with the British Empire: an American ally in World War II, but nonetheless undermined by Washington as an imperial competitor.<br \/>\nThe concept of a \u2018global majority\u2019,\u00a0formulated at the start of the Ukraine operation, originally described those states that refused to join Western sanctions and could be Russia\u2019s partners in a new world order. But it soon became a vague synonym for \u2018the non-West\u2019.\u00a0Turning it into a consolidated anti-West bloc, BRICS and SCO against NATO and the EU, would be self-deception.<br \/>\nThe so-called majority will not consolidate in 2026. China, Qatar, Cambodia, and Kazakhstan will all act primarily in their own interests, including with the West. UN voting illustrates this. We have also seen armed clashes between SCO members India and Pakistan, and between ASEAN members Cambodia and Thailand. On the eve of 2026, relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE worsened sharply, reshaping the Yemen conflict.<br \/>\nThus, multipolarity is becoming reality rather than aspiration. Key global players will be the United States and China, as well as Russia and India. They will not embody neat civilizational blocs, but will represent the diversity of civilization itself, which is the signature of multipolarity. Each will focus on domestic development while seeking to shape its surrounding region to its advantage.<br \/>\nThe same will occur at the regional level, where Brazil, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and South Africa already play leading roles. Transformations inside the Western world may eventually restore a degree of autonomy to Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. But if this happens, it will not be in 2026.<\/p>\n<p>This article was first published by the\u00a0magazine Profile\u00a0and was translated and edited by the RT team.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A cautious forecast of what international relations will look like in 2026 Experience shows that making predictions even a year ahead is risky. 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